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Introduction
Norms (i.e., common understandings about obligatory, permitted, or forbidden behavior) 1 inuence our behavior in many real-world scenarios. People entering buildings keep doors open for others, parents' nancial support for kindergarten initiatives is typically proportional to income as we expect the tax burden to be and men take their hats o when entering churches.
There are numerous other examples of how norms guide behavior in groups, so that economics has devoted a substantial amount of eort to analyzing the inuence of social norms in the last decades (important contributions include, e.g., Sugden, 1986 , Sethi, 1996 , or Sober & Wilson, 1998 . Of particular interest for the economist's study of norms is their interplay with individual incentives. The archetype of a potential conict between social norms and individual incentives is the social dilemma, where individual and collective interests are disaligned. Norm violations and others' responses to such violations have long been debated by the experimental literature in the context of decentralized sanctioning mechanisms. The latter have been shown to foster and maintain voluntary cooperation (seminal work has been provided by Ostrom et al., 1992, for common-pool resources, and Yamagishi, 1986 , or Fehr & Gächter, 2000 , for public goods). This paper sets out to analyze explicitly the norms of cooperation prevailing in situations of this kind, and systematically compares potential norm candidates in an experiment taylored to this purpose. More precisely, we elicit the norms employed in sanctioning uncooperative behavior when there are multiple sanctioning stages, and examine whether other group members who are not directly involved in the punishment actions share the same norms for sanctioning.
When thinking about cooperation norms in social-dilemma situations, one important distinction is that between relative and absolute norms. If a relative norm is made use of, the standard against which a player evaluates the behavior of others rises or drops along with the level of cooperation within the group. In other words, the cooperation level expected from an individual may be dierent in a cooperative group from the level expected in a less cooperative group. In contrast, absolute norms provide reference points for behavior independent of the group's current level of cooperation (for instance, there could be a norm always to cooperate fully). Relative norms have been estimated in a number of studies. Several authors rely on the average degree of cooperation within the group as the norm (Fehr & Gächter, 2000 , 2002 , Anderson & Putterman, 2006 , and Sefton et al., 2007 , while more recent studies focus on the degree of cooperation of the player 1 Cf. Ostrom (2000) . 2 who punishes (Herrmann et al., 2008 , Egas & Riedl, 2008 , Sutter et al., 2008 , or Reuben & Riedl, 2009 ). Yet, little is known with respect to absolute norms and with respect to the question of whether relative or absolute norms guide cooperation and sanctions. An exception are Carpenter and Matthews (2009) who compare the predictive power of relative and absolute norms in explaining the sanctioning behavior. They show that by and large, absolute norms t the data better than relative norms.
We extend the work of Carpenter and Matthews with respect to several important aspects. First, we are able to disentangle punishment related to a cooperative norm from acts of retaliation by (i) employing multiple sanctioning stages in conjunction with (ii) self-contained episodes of interaction (players change their interaction partners after each encounter). These features allow us to restrict counterpunishment actions to the individual episode of interaction, so that it does not directly aect the data obtained from later
interactions. An interesting question following directly from the above is whether a persisting cooperation norm will play a role in higher iterations of punishment. Everyday experience tells us that the majority of situa- The use of multiple sanctioning stages has a further advantage. It has long been known that a non-negligible fraction of punishment actions in socialdilemma situations is directed at high-contributors (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000, or Cinyabuguma et al., 2006) . However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the studies conducted on the topic has answered the question of what the motivations for such punishment are. The present paper makes a rst step in that direction, being able to separate between retaliation and spiteful or competitive thinking. At the same time, we can largely rule out random errors as another possible source of high-contributor punishment suggested in the literature (ibd.).
On a second dimension, Carpenter and Matthews provide evidence that subjects employ dierent norms for the decisions of (i) whether to punish a player or not, and (ii) how hard they want to punish that particular player.
We further explore this eect by explicitly disentangling both decisions: in our setting, players rst announce to punish a certain player (at a cost), before deciding on the level of punishment in a second step. This will be interesting in a number of ways. It allows us to analyze the degree of consistency between the norms, both with respect to the question of whether the two decisions are triggered by relative or absolute norms, and that of whether 3 absolute norms in case they matter are similar across these decisions.
Finally, we provide additional insights on cooperation norms prevailing within groups by introducing an important treatment variation. In the standard setting, norms are revealed only indirectly by those players actively sanctioning others. However, there is a substantial number of players who abstain from punishment actions. Still, it is not clear whether this abstention is owed to the players' norms of cooperation not being violated, or whether it is due to other reasons, such as an aversion to forcing others by means of punishment, or that the costs of punishment are higher than the player's disutility from the norm violation. As far as these players' cooperation norm is concerned, the traditional setting provides little evidence. In order to elicit a cooperation norm using data from all players, we introduce a treatment condition in which, for each punishment action announced, those group members who are neither the punisher nor the punishee with respect to that specic action have to voice their (dis-)agreement with it. In order not to render the announced (dis-)approvals of players completely arbitrary, but to create some commitment with respect to these statements on norm-related behavior, all players are informed about them. As such, agreements and disagreements have no formal consequences, while they provide additional information on norms within a group. Further details concerning the experimental design are discussed in the follwing two sections.
Our results indicate that in line with the ndings of Carpenter and Matthews, absolute norms seem to organize the decisions relating to norm violations very well. Particularly, we see that absolute norms unlike relative norms robustly predict punishment of norm violation across several punishment stages. Moreover, the data indicate that the absolute norm remains constant across various kinds of punishment decisions suggesting that approximately 3/4 of the maximum degree of cooperation serves as the prevailing cooperation norm, as long as it is not perturbed by retaliative actions.
Interestingly, we can divide punishment stages into three categories. In the rst stage, negative norm violation (i.e., cooperation levels of less than 3/4) triggers the announcement of and support for a punishment action and determines the severity of punishment. In the second stage, retaliation seems to enter as another main motivation for punishment. Finally, in the third stage, we observe a mixture of (counter-)retaliative actions and sanction enforcement, while the absolute cooperation norm remains at approximately 3/4 of the maximum level. The results suggest two things: there are persistent absolute norms for cooperation within small groups, while in stages 2 and 3, additional motives for punishment manifest themselves.
The remaining article is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the game and presents our research questions. Section 3 describes the experi-mental design. Section 4 reports the results, while section 5 discusses the ndings along with their implications.
The game and research questions
For our experimental investigation, we introduce two versions of a standard linear public-good game implementing a voluntary contribution mechanism with n players, n ≥ 2, and multiple punishment stages, the basic game and the opinion game. Both games consist of an endogenous (but nite) number of stages. In the rst step, each player i receives an endowment of e > 0 monetary units and decides on her contribution x i to the public good, with 0 ≤ x i ≤ e. Each monetary unit invested in the public-good has a marginal rate of per-capita return α, with 1/n < α < 1.
In the second step, each player is informed about the individual contributions to the public-good and the interim payo which equalŝ
Furthermore, each player i announces whether and to which of the other players she wishes to assign punishment points. Punishment points p i→j reduce the payo of player j according to the details described below. Filing an announcement a i→j , a i→j ∈ {0, 1}, incurs a cost of f a > 0 for i. 
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and therefore, we have a natural limit for punishment points, p max = 10. 3 Therefore, the payo equals
where F a denotes the total number of announcements made by i times f a and the cost function c : {0, 1, 2, ..., 10} → IR is a strictly-monotone increasing function with c(0) = 0. All players are informed about the resulting payos.
If there has been at least one announcement to assign punishment points in step two, additional stages of steps 2 to 4 follow: we allow all players to make new announcements (each incurring costs of f a ). To avoid potential demand eects in the experiment, we do not impose a restriction of punishment opportunities to those who have been punished in the prior stage as, e.g., in the design of Nikiforakis (2008) . Again, in the opinion condition, players not directly aected by an announcement of player i against j simultaneously voice their opinion on the new announcements. New announcements allow players to increase the number of punishment points, even for players who have not been punished before.
4 All players are informed about the resulting payos. We repeatedly allow for new announcements and increases in punishment points until no player makes a further announcement to punish.
Notice that players can only apply for and execute further punishment if this does not cause their own current payo π i to become negative. Therefore, the number of iterations is nite and restricted at the most to iπ i /f a . Finally, players are informed about the payos and the game ends.
Since subjects play the game repeatedly over a nite number of rounds with changing anonymous interaction partners, the equilibrium of the game in both treatment conditions is rather obvious in light of standard theory according to which any player will only be concerned with his own monetary payo. On the equilibrium path of the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, nothing changes compared to the standard public-good game. If a player deviates making an announcement, other players are indierent between endorsing and dissenting from the announced action. Whether it is endorsed or not, the player making the announcement does not have any incentive to carry out the punishment, as this is costly to her. Anticipating this, no player will contribute to the public-good, since it is by ∂π i /∂x i = −1 + α < 0 a dominant strategy not to do so. Fehr and Gächter (2000) , and many others, players are willing to sacrice own payo in order to punish others.
In this respect, one has to distinguish between prosocial punishment and antisocial punishment. The literature on public-good games refers to prosocial punishment if the punished player contributes to the public-good less than the norm (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008) . Thus, a norm is a(n implicitly agreed upon) reference value, or contribution target, the deviation from which is deemed inappropriate by the group of interacting players, and therefore leads to deviating players being sanctioned. This sanctioning is referred to as prosocial if it can be interpreted as the attempt to reduce free-riding.
In contrast, if the player contributes more than the norm, punishing this player is characterized as being antisocial.
6 Potential explanations for antisocial punishment are, for example, a taste for conformity, revenge, or simply spite.
Despite its importance for human interactions, there is very little evidence concerning the nature of the norms that trigger both prosocial and antisocial punishment. More precisely, there is still some uncertainty about the appropriate reference value to employ when modeling behavior in social-dilemma situations with punishment opportunities. Our study attempts to provide an important empirical step in this respect, contributing to our understanding of sanctioning behavior in public-good games. Thereby, we hope to provide a starting point for future models of norm-related behavior in the broader eld of social dilemmas.
When thinking of social norms, a number of questions arises that will be subsequently examined in this article. Carpenter to make two random mistakes in a row to exert unwanted punishment: they can always assign 0 points after an announcement. 7 The second category would simply mean that the norm is mis-specied. If this was indeed the case, it would show up in our absolute-norm model as a high absolute norm.
Finally, categories (iii)-(v) concern the distinction between point assignements out of revenge, or retaliation, and antisocial punishment not triggered by received punishment points, be it out of spite or competitive thinking. By means of our design, we are able to address this distinction. Therefore, to recapitulate, our second research question is RQ 2. Does antisocial punishment as opposed to retaliation (i.e., punishment triggered by received points) signicantly contribute to explaining decisions on whether to announce punishment and to punish a player? Are there dierences over punishment stages?
Finally, let us discuss the new aspect of our experiment, the elicitation of bystanders' norms of cooperation applied in evaluating others' punishment actions. As described above, we opt to disclose these evaluations publicly, so as not to render them meaningless in the eyes of our subjects. However, the public announcement of others' (dis)agreement may change behavior. Masclet et al. (2003) report a positive eect of (nonmonetary) social 7 Such errors are rare: in basic, the fraction of 0-choices after an announcement is 3%, while it is 16% in opinion; in the latter, however, the number is largely driven by occasions in which neither player allowed to voice her opinion favored punishment.
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(dis)approval on cooperation in public-good games. 8 One reading of this result is that public social assessment of behavior leads to an increase in the degree to which players identify with their group, which in turn may foster cooperation. However, this eect should be much less pronounced if present at all in our setting where groups' composition changes after each round.
Moreover, in the experiment conducted by Masclet et al., players' voicing of (dis-)approval was an intentional and directed message, rather than a routinely elicited information. Finally, Noussair and Tucker (2007) have shown the eect of social approval to rapidly diminish over the course of the experiment. Hence, whether the display of information on others' evaluations about one's punishment endeavours has any eect on behavior is rather doubtful.
A more interesting question is whether players employ dierent norms when they are in the role of the punisher than when they only act as`impartial observers'. We therefore set out to answer our nal research question, focusing on the relationship between player roles and cooperation norms: RQ 3. Are the norm for social approval and the corresponding norms for announcements and punishment identical?
Experimental design
We parameterized our model as follows: let there be n = 4 players each endowed with e = 20 experimental currency units. We choose α = 0.4 and announcement costs equal f a = 1. Finally, for the individual punishment costs, we adopt the cost function used in Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Nikiforakis (2008). The costs for player i punishing player j are given by the convex sequence for increasing p i→j shown in Table 1 .
For recruitment, we use the software package ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) , the experimental software is written using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) ; experiments are run at the University of Bonn Experimental Economics Laboratory (BonnEconLab). On the day, subjects are welcomed and asked to draw lots, in order to assign each of them to a cabin. They are asked to move to their cubicle straight away. Once all subjects are seated, the instructions are handed to them in written form before being read aloud by the experimenter. 9 Subjects are given the opportunity to ask any questions concerning 9 At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are informed that an unspecied and 9 Subjects play ten repetitions (rounds ) of the game. To prevent the possibility of forming an individual reputation, every player receives an identication number between 1 and 4 at the beginning of each repetition, which she retains for the duration of the round, but which changes randomly in the next one. Furthermore, in order to prevent the emergence of group-specic cooperation norms and to test whether there is a global norm for contributions to the public-good, we randomly form groups anew at the beginning of each round out of a pool of 12 subjects (`stranger matching'), while the group composition remains constant within each round.
Altogether, 144 subjects, mostly students majoring in various elds par- 
Data overview
In Figure 1 , we depict round-wise payos, contributions, and punishment aggregated over all matching groups for each treatment. Even though contributions start out slightly higher in opinion (12.9 vs 10.1; contribution levels in the rst, second, and third round are dierent at a level of p = 0.0782, p = 0.1093, and p = 0.1495, respectively), this dierence wears away very quickly. In line with the ndings of Noussair and Tucker (2007), we do not nd any dierence in later rounds, nor in the overall contribution level.
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In the nal round, we observe average contributions of half the endowment in both treatments. Furthermore, we do not nd any signicant dierences for aggregate punishment nor eciency levels as measured by average payos.
In both treatments, average payos start just above the Nash-equilibrium benchmark of 20 experimental currency units and oscillate around a value of 24.5 units towards the end. Average punishment points assigned, on the other hand, fall from 1.2 in the rst round to approximately 0.3, in the nal two, for both treatments. The average number of punishment iterations is only insignicantly higher in opinion (1.92 vs 1.72 in basic, p = 0.8095). 12
Finally, we do not nd any signicant dierences in punishment levels when testing each iteration individually, either.
Looking at the decision of whether to punish or not, we nd that overall, about 6% of all possible announcements are made (5.7% in basic, 6.2% in opinion). The time trend mirrors that of punishment in general: whereas in the rst round, 8.7% (7.8%) in basic (opinion) of the potential announcements are made, the corresponding gures for the nal round are 3.7% for both treatments. Again, the reported treatment dierences are far from being signicant. 15 Therefore, we will pool the data from both treatments in our ensuing analysis of contribution norms. The ndings from our regressions reported below namely the non-signicance of our treatment dummies corroborate this claim. We take this as an indication that we can interpret the norms elicited from non-punishers through their endorsement or dissent in the same way as those elicited from the punishers by observing their actions irrespective of whether other players are allowed to voice their opinion.
Contribution norms
To identify the determinants of players' behavior in our public-good game, we will compare the inuence of two relative and 21 absolute norms for all three punishment-related decisions of our experiment: the decision to announce punishment, the`opinion decision', and the actual punishment decision. For each iteration, we will estimate coecients and absolute norms separately, so that we can identify whether the estimated cooperation norms are stable across iterations. Notice that the number of instances of ongoing iterations 15 Furthermore, the results are very similar to those reported by Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2009) for their escalation treatment.
beyond the third decreases rapidly, so that, in order to rely on a sucient number of observations, we have to restrict our analysis to the rst three iterations of each round.
For the analysis of announcements as well as of the opinions elicited we apply a probit regression with individual error clusters. Thus, we estimate the vector β for the basic econometric models
and
where Prob(a t,m i→j = 1) (Prob(v t,m k:i→j = 1)) stands for the latent probability that i announces to punish j in round t and iteration m (that k endorses i's announcement to punish j in round t and iteration m), x for the matrix of regressors, β for the vector of coecients, ς i for a vector of (unobserved) individual error clusters, and u t,m for a vector of uncorrelated errors.
For the analysis of punishment decisions, we apply a tobit regression with individual error clusters. Thus, for the basic econometric model
we estimate the vector β, wherep t,m i→j stands for the latent number of punishment points i assigns to j in round t and iteration m, and p t,m i→j is restricted to the interval [0, 10].
In our quest to identify the norm governing punishment, we compare four models each for the announcement decision, the voiced opinions, and the punishment decision. The rst model contains neither an absolute nor a relative norm, but only the control variables (see below), allowing us to assess the importance of either norm for punishment by comparison to the rst model. The second and third models test the importance of dierent relative norms. In the second model, we focus on a group's average contribution.
For this purpose, let us dene two distance measures. The rst, denoted by r − , is the absolute dierence between the contribution of the player to be 13 punished, j, in round t and the average contribution in the group, x t , if the former is smaller than the latter, and zero, otherwise:
This variable decreases in the punishee's contribution as long as this contribution is below the group average. A signicant positive eect of r − would indicate that prosocial punishment is guided by this rst relative norm. The second variable, denoted by r + , reects positive deviations from the group average and measures the distance between the contribution of player j and the average contribution in the group in round t if the contribution is larger than the average, while the variable is zero otherwise:
If there is antisocial punishment determined by the rst relative norm, we would expect to nd a signicant positive eect of r + .
The third model tests the importance of another relative norm, the absolute distance between the contribution of player j and the contribution of the punishing player i in round t. For this purpose, let us dene two measures r − and r + , as
Notice that we retain the reference point of the punisher contribution (x t i in equation (8) Analogously, the fourth model tests the importance of absolute norms.
As in Carpenter and Matthews (2009), we do not allow the absolute norm to change over time in order to increase our ability to distinguish between the absolute and the relative norms. Two regressors measure the absolute distance between the contribution of player j in round t and an integer number y, y ∈ [0, 20], dened in analogy to the variables measuring the relative norms above: a − := |min{x t j − y, 0}|, and a + := max{x t j − y, 0}.
We expect to nd a signicantly positive eect for the rst (second) variable, if there is prosocial (antisocial) punishment that is governed by the absolute norm. Based on a grid search over all possible contribution choices, we select and report that absolute norm tting the data best according to the log likelihood. This grid search is conducted for each decision and each iteration separately, so that we allow absolute norms to dier. However, assuming that there is an absolute standard guiding behavior, we should observe a consistent y over the dierent decisions and iterations.
Along with the inuence of relative and absolute norms, we control for a number of other regressors that may inuence the decisions. For the analysis of the decisions on whether to announce punishment, and of how strongly to punish, those variables include the contribution of the player who punishes (x t i ) and the sum of contributions of the two players not involved (X t k ) from that particular round. We expect to nd positive eects for both as noncooperators are typically prosocially punished by players who contribute a substantial amount to the public-good (see, e.g., Cinyabuguma et al., 2006) , while free-riders may be more likely to be punished in cooperative groups for reasons of conformity. For potential temporal inuences (e.g., learning over the course of the experiment) we test by adding the variable round. Moreover, the dummy variable opinion marks those decisions from the opinion treatment. Additionally, for punishment decisions, we also include the variable sum t v which counts the number of other players in favor of the punishment action in the opinion treatment, and which is zero for all observations from the basic treatment. Therefore, for punishment points, a negative (positive) eect of opinion indicates that there are less (more) points assigned in opinion than in basic if none of the players agrees with the punishment action in the former. However, a negative (positive) eect of sum t v indicates that in opinion, less (more) points are assigned if more of the others consent.
For the analysis of elicited opinions, we have to consider that all observations come from the opinion treatment (thus, there is no treatment variable in this regression), and that decisions are made by one of the`third parties'. Therefore, instead of the sum of contribution of the two players not involved, a regressor for the contribution of the player voicing her opinion
Here, similar to the argument that players contributing larger amounts to the public-good are more likely to punish, we expect to nd a positive eect of the bystander's own contributions on the endorsement of punishment announcements.
Finally, for the regressions on decisions made in the second (third) iteration, we test for the potential eect of retaliation by means of the variable j→i we expect this to be the case, as according to the ndings of Nikiforakis (2008) , including a second punishment stage in a public-good game may trigger severe retaliation. In order to analyze dierences in retaliation across the two treatments, we include the interaction eect p t,1 j→i × opinion (p t,2 j→i × opinion) in our regressions on announcements and on punishment points.
Results for the estimations of mean marginal eects on announcements are reported in 
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The results for the rst iteration indicate that the probability to announce the punishment of another player increases in the punisher's contribution to the public-good. This holds true even for the third model, although the argument is a little more complex: in this model, we test for the inuence of the distance between the punisher's and the punishee's contribution. For that reason, the coecient for the punisher's contribution x t i measures the inuence of the level of both the punisher's and the punishee's contributions for a given distance. On the other hand, for a given punishee contribution, an increase in the announcing player's contribution leads to a higher distance r − , and thus, a higher probability of announcement, as stated above. For three of our models, we also nd a signicant (positive) eect of increasing contributions of the players being neither the punisher nor the target of the punishment action. Finally, the likelihood of an announcement decreases in the course of the experiment.
With respect to our research question RQ 1 concerning the norms of contribution in the game, we nd that in the rst iteration, the relative norm r − outperforms the absolute norm in contrast to previous ndings by that, in the third iteration, spiteful or competitive thinking nds its way into the game, giving rise to antisocial punishment. Yet, we cannot exclude the possibility that a dierent motivation that has not been looked at so far is driving the nding: sanction enforcement, in the sense of punishment of those who fail to punish norm-violators in the rst place (cf., e.g., Henrich and Boyd, 2001, for an evolutionary model of cooperation through sanction enforcement). There is an indication that this may actually be a better explanation for our data: there is no inherent need for a spiteful or competitively thinking person to wait before reducing others' income, while for sanction enforcement, the enforcer has to wait for at least one iteration. Interpreting the results in this way, we observe a mix of three dierent motivations for sanctions: high-contributors lashing back at retaliating low-contributors, low-contributors retaliating against second-iteration punishment after enduring sanctions in iteration one, and high-contributors punishing other highcontributors for not taking part in the sanctioning of low-contributors. The signicant positive eect of upward deviations from the absolute norm of 16 seems to suggest that sanction enforcers hold their peers (in contributions) to higher moral standards, the more these had been cooperating. Surprisingly, there is a signicant positive eect of round in iteration 3, suggesting that arguments tend to become more intense over time. In other words, it is Let us now turn to our research question RQ 3, asking whether those not directly aected by a punishment action employ the same contribution norms as punishers themselves when evaluating an announcement. An interesting result to be seen from Table 3 is that for explaining players' opinions about others' announcements, the absolute norm performs best on all three iterations. More specically, the relative norm performing best on punishment actions in iteration one, the punisher's contribution, does poorly in explaining approval in the same iteration, even though it gives the absolute norm a hard race in iterations two and three. This suggests that bystanders tend to evaluate (rst-iteration) prosocial punishment actions against absolute standards rather than the adequacy of a relative norm.
The fact that the role of norms in higher iterations is rather limited seems to be owed to the fact that prosocial punishment loses its predominance: when subjects judge retaliative actions, they seem to be guided by the severity of punishment the retaliator has had to endure rather than by contribution levels (cf. the line determined by p t,1 j→i in Table 3 ). In other words, bystanders tend to nd it acceptable that victims of unduely harsh sanctions`defend' themselves. Correspondingly, it is only in iteration 1 that we nd that a punisher will meet stronger endorsement the higher her own cooperation level is, and the more the punishee's contribution falls short of the 3/4 benchmark, where the second eect is about twice as strong. Taking these facts together, this suggests that players are very eective in singling out the motivations of dierent punishment actions.
What is notable with respect to RQ 3 is that in iterations one and three, the absolute norm estimated is essentially the same 3/4 of players' endowment we already found for announcements on these iterations. Only for the second iteration do we nd a norm diering quite dramatically from that found for punishment announcements. While positive deviations from the absolute norm of 1 do not signicantly contribute to explaining endorsements, there is a relatively large increase in agreement if the player to be punished free-rode completely. Given the absolute norm selects complete free-riding to have a dierential (yet insignicant) eect, it seems that a sanctioned player's complete uncooperativeness mitigates bystanders' compassion.
Turning to the punishment decisions, we nd similar results to the ones for announcements. This also holds with respect to our research questions RQ 1 and RQ 2. As can be seen from Table 4 , there is no indication of antisocial punishment that has not been triggered by received points, but strong evidence for retaliation. In the rst iteration, the relative norm r − outperforms the average-referential norm r − , as well as the absolute norm that is, once again, estimated to be 3/4 of the endowment. In iterations 2 and 3, the absolute norm performs better. Notice further that the absolute norms performing best in predicting the level of punishment points assigned are exactly the same as those estimated in our announcements analysis across all iterations. Thus, although estimated separately, both decisions seem to rely on the same norm of approximately 3/4 of the endowment (unless the norm is confounded by retarded sanctions as it commonly happens in iteration 2).
Similar to what has been said for the norms, our results are similar to those for the announcement decision in all iterations also with respect to the inuence of other variables. Additionally, approval of an action has a signicant inuence on the points assigned across iterations, as evidenced by the signicant eect of sum t v (i.e., the number of players in favor of the 20 Remarkably, there is one result for punishment that does not seem to t into the broader picture painted so far: on the third iteration, the number of punishment points assigned decreases in the number of punishment points received from the punishee on iteration 2, an eect that is nullied or even reverted by the presence of an`opinion poll'. What this seems to suggest is that retaliation tends to calm down in iteration 3 in basic as indicated by the signicant negative marginal eect of p t,2
j→i , while the interaction of this variable with the dummy opinion suggests that punishment and counter-punishment sequences continue in opinion. In other words, the public feedback on social approval seems to entrench opposing parties in their positions, so that arguments are fought out more intensely in terms of the punishment level (but not in terms of the number of actions, as our announcement analysis shows).
Discussion
In a recent study, Carpenter and Matthews (2009) found that cooperation norms employed in a social-dilemma situation tend to be of an absolute character. In their study, experimental subjects seem to evaluate behavior against an absolute number rather than relative to their own or their group's behavior. This nding is noteworthy, as scholars have mostly restricted their attention to relative measures when attempting to elicit cooperation norms.
However, the absolute norms Carpenter and Matthews found for the decision on whether to assign punishment points and that on how many to assign diered substantially from each other, a result that, if robust, would pose a serious challenge to existing theories on the motivations of punishment.
To obtain a better understanding of subjects' cooperation norms, and to dig deeper into how they determine dierent sanction-related decisions, we extend the line of research pioneered by Carpenter and Matthews with respect to three important dimensions. To disentangle retaliation from punishment related to norms of contribution, we limit interactions to being Gächter (2000) . Furthermore, to obtain a clearer picture about whether the decisions to punish and how many points to assign are driven by dierent processes, we explicitly have our subjects take these decisions separately.
Finally, we introduce a second treatment to provide us with data on how bystanders evaluate punishment actions, an information that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been looked at by any preceeding studies.
Our ndings are noteworthy in a number of ways. First of all, we nd support for a nding already made by Carpenter and Matthews: the average- Furthermore, like Carpenter and Matthews, we nd strong support for the inuence of an absolute cooperation norm. However, on the rst iteration, in both decisions taken by the punisher this norm is outperformed by the relative norm set by the punisher's own contribution. In contrast, for bystanders' decisions, the absolute norm leads to a better t across all iterations. This might not be as surprising as it may seem: if we interpret behavior on the rst punishment stage as an intuitive reaction to others' cooperation levels,
we may indeed expect that behavior to be self-referential. On later stages, in contrast, evaluations of others' choices will be comparatively more detached, and thus, more focused on the absolute level of`sanction-deservingness' of the punishee as will the evaluations of others' punishment endeavors. Summing up, the answer to our research question RQ 1 is to be contingent on the decision concerned: absolute contribution norms organize those decisions that cannot be seen as intuitive rst reactions to others contribution decisions better than relative contribution norms; punishment decisions on the rst iteration are best predicted by the self-referential relative norm r +/− .
A third important result is that, in contrast to the nding of Carpenter and Matthews, the best-performing absolute norms are very consistent across dierent decisions within the dierent iterations. Not only that, the cooperation norm of 3/4 of players' endowment from the rst iteration even carries over to the third one, suggesting a certain stability over time. Remarkably, however, this norm seems to disappear in the second iteration. This is a clear sign that the processes generating our data dier across dierent iterations.
In the rst stage, prosocial punishment by high-contributing players is the predominant factor. Our design keeps this iteration clear from revengerelated point assignments and minimizes assignments due to random errors.
On the other hand, our analysis shows that antisocial punishment for other reasons does not play a role, either. In other words, the data we obtain from the rst iteration is particularly well-suited for comparing potential candidate variables to build a theory of norm-related punishment on.
In the second iteration, we observe a mix of counterpunishment and retarded sanctions left out in the rst stage, but we still do not nd any evidence for antisocial punishment for reasons other than revenge. Retarded sanctions, however, will tend to bring the absolute norm down, which is what we observe in our analysis, while retaliators will tend to be relatively insensitive to the contribution levels of their opponents. As a consequence, a lower norm will provide a better t. An observation that prima facie looks surprising is the extremely low absolute norm in bystanders' evaluation in the second iteration. Only players not contributing at all meet less endorsement when announcing punishment on this iteration. At the same time, the only signicant determinant of bystanders' agreement with the assignment of points in the second iteration is the number of points priorly received by the announcing player. In particular, subjects agree with retaliation more often the higher the initial sanctions are. In other words, subjects seem to endorse retaliation when sanctions are unduely harsh. The fact that the absolute norm selects the very lower end of the contribution spectrum to have a dierential eect, even though not signicantly so, seems to suggest that bystanders' compassion towards harshly sanctioned players is mitigated (only) if these players have proven to be completely uncooperative.
In the third iteration, nally, there is another type of punishment intermingling with retaliative action that could be attributed to either spitefulness, competitive thinking, or sanction enforcement, the latter being a type of sanctioning behavior often assumed to be the stabilizing force behind prosocial punishment (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 2001) . Judging by the fact that this type of high-contributor sanctioning shows only late in the interaction, we 24 tend to favor the latter explanation. In terms of our research question RQ 2, the above leads us to conclude that`unsolicited' antisocial punishment does not play a role in early stages when controling for retaliative actions.
Whether this changes in later stages, or whether the punishment of highcontributors we observe in the third iteration is due to sanction enforcement is an important question that will need further research.
As far as our research question RQ 3 is concerned, we nd astonishingly consistent estimates for absolute norms over dierent decisions within an iteration, and thus, even over dierent player roles. However, we have to introduce two caveats: (i) in the rst iteration, the fact that the absolute norms estimated from both punisher and bystander choices are identical seems to be a coincidence of dierent processes leading to similar results: in our interpretation, rst-stage punishers intuitively react in a self-referential manner after having made a contribution suciently close to 3/4 of their endowment, while bystanders take a more detached view, evaluating punishee behavior against a more neutral absolute standard that is also equal to three quarters; (ii) especially in the second iteration, support is primarily driven by what looks like empathy with overly-sanctioned retaliators. Even if the rst caveat appears to be a strong point against our hypothesis, we would like to emphasize that the two processes may be closely related: rst-stage punishers may view themselves as being entitled to sanction others because they complied with the absolute 3/4-norm. Taken together, three quarters of players' endowment seems to be the socially accepted reference point for punisher contributions in our experiment, as well as the standard against which punishees' behavior is evaluated. However, players do distinguish between punishment related to norm violations with respect to (i) contributions and (ii) adequate punishment severity. It is only with respect to the former that our estimated absolute norm provides a robust reference point.
Overall, our experimental results underline the importance of norms for behavior even in a setting with anonymous, self-contained episodes of interaction and changing partners between those episodes. The fact that the estimated norms tend to be consistent over decisions and, to some degree, even over iterations, suggests that we are observing truly social norms in our experiment, in the sense that players seem to bring an intuitive understanding of adequate behavior into the laboratory that is likely to be shaped by cultural values rather than being a mere experimental artifact. In this light, we are condent that our results contribute to the understanding of normrelated behavior, enhancing the way economists think about and model this important element of human interaction.
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Appendix A: Instructions 17
Thank you very much for your participation in this experiment. You are now participating in an economic experiment. If you carefully read the following explanations, you can earn a substantial amount of money, contingent on your decisions. Therefore, it is very important that you read these explanations carefully.
The instructions handed out to you are for your private information only.
During the experiment there is a strict prohibition of any kind of communi- The experiment will consist of two parts. In the following, the course of part one will be described. The explanations regarding the second part will be given to you later. Altogether, the rst part consists of 10 periods. In every period, the experiment will consist of 4 steps. Participants are divided into groups of four. Therefore, apart from yourself your group will contain three other members. However, you do not know the identity of the other participants. In every period, the composition of the group will be newly determined by chance.
The rst step
At the beginning of each period, every participant will be provided with 20
Ecu which we will call endowment in the following. Your task is to make a decision on the use of your endowment. You have to decide how many out of the 20 Ecu you deposit into a project (0 to 20) and how many you keep for yourself. The consequences of this decision will be explained in more detail below.
17 The following instructions are translations of the German originals that were adapted from Nikiforakis (2008) and are available from the authors upon request. Treatment variations are indicated by brackets.
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Once all members of the group have decided on their deposits into the project, you are informed about the contributions of the group members, your payo from the project, and your payo from step 1. Your payo is calculated according to the following simple formula:
Your payo from the rst step equals: 20 -(your deposit into the common project) + 0,4 x (sum of deposits of all group members into the common project)
As you see, your payo from step 1 of a period is composed of two parts:
• Ecu you keep for yourself = endowment -your deposit into the project • The payo from the project = 0,4 x sum of deposits of all group members The payo from the project of all other group members is calculated using the same formula, i.e., each group member receives the same payo from the project. If, for example, the sum of deposits of all group members equals 60
Ecu, you and all other group members obtain a payo of 0.4x60 = 24 Ecu from the project. If the group members deposit a total of 9 Ecu into the project, you and all other group members receive a payo of 0.4x9 = 3.6 Ecu from the project.
Every Ecu you keep earns you a payo of 1 Ecu. If, instead, you deposit one Ecu out of your endowment into the project of your group, the sum of deposits will rise by 1 Ecu and your payo from the project will rise by 0.4x1 = 0.4 Ecu. However, the payo of all other group members will also rise by 0.4 Ecu, such that the total earnings of the group increase by 0.4x4 = 1.6 Ecu. Therefore, through your deposits into the project, all other group members will also gain something. Conversely, you will also gain something from the deposits into the project of other group members. For each Ecu another group member deposits into the project, you earn 0.4 Ecu.
The second step
In the second step, you are informed about the deposits of the other group members into the project. After that, each group member may announce to assign points to one or several other group members. Each announcement costs you 1 Ecu. Other group members can also announce to assign points to you.
In the third step, you can only assign points to group members you designated on the second step. All group members will be informed about all announcements of point assignments.
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[opinion The two group members not aected by an announcement can approve or reject it. An announcement that has not been approved by at least one unaected player is considered to be rejected. All group members are subsequently informed about the individual approvals or rejections.] The third step If you choose 0 points for a certain group member, you do not change that group member's payo. If, however, you assign one point to a member, you decrease the corresponding group member's payo in Ecu from the rst step by 10 percent. If you assign 2 points to a group member, you decrease that person's payo by 20 percent, etc. In other words, the points you assign determine how much a group member's payo in Ecu from the rst step is decreased. If a person receives a total of 4 points, then that person's payo from the rst step is curtailed by 40 percent. In case a person receives exactly 10 or more points, then that person's payo from the rst step will be reduced by 100 percent.
If you assign points, you incur costs in Ecu that depend on your assignment of points. You may assign between 0 and 10 points to every group member. The more points you assign to a group member, the higher your costs are. The total costs in Ecu are calculated as the sum of costs of points assigned to all other group members. The following table species the relationship of assigned points and the costs of assigning points in Ecu: Your total costs for points, that is, the sum of costs for points assigned to other group members and the sum of costs for announcements will be deducted from your payo from the rst step. Your period payo after the third step is therefore given by the following formula:
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Your period payo therefore amounts to: (Your payo from the rst step)(1 -(sum of points you receive)/10) -(sum of costs for points you assigned) -(sum of costs for announcements) If you receive more than 10 points from other group members, the maximum amount deducted from you will be your total payo from the rst step.
In other words, your payo from the rst step can only be reduced to 0.
However, you still have to bear the total costs of points you assigned. Therefore, your period payo can become negative through according decisions.
You can make up for negative period payos through the at-fee payment of 25 Ecu you received at the beginning.
The fourth step
After all participants have made their decisions, they are informed about the points assigned to themselves and about their origin.
If at least one group member has announced the assignment of points on the second step, each group member is, again, allowed to announce the assignment of points to one or several other group members (otherwise the period payo equals the payo from the rst step and there are no further announcements). Each new announcement again causes a cost of 1 point.
[opinion Again, those group members not involved may voice their approval.] Afterwards, the level of points may be increased or new points may be assigned.
Please note: if you assign points to a group member you have already apportioned points to within this period, what is relevant for both your period payo and the aected group member's payo is the total sum of points, not the sum of the individual assignments. In other words, points assigned to the same group member are added: if, for example, you rst assign 2 points and later on another 3 points to a group member, you have to bear total costs of 9 Ecu (and not 2+4 = 6 Ecu), plus 2 Ecu for the announcements.
You can only make announcements or assign points if this does not lower your period payo below zero. Again, all group members are informed about their current period payos and new announcements and assignments of points are possible. This repetition only ends when no group member announces the assignment of further points. If no group member announces the assignment of further points, a new period starts in a newly and randomly composed group. 32 
Total payo
The total payo is given by the sum of period payos from all periods.
